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Signs and Minds: An Introduction to the Theory of Semiotic Systems
by James H. Fetzer

1 Peirce's Theory of Signs, p 135
Peirce identified three ways in which a sign may stand for what it stands[:
- resemblance: "icons"
- causes or effects: "indices"
- conventional agreements or habitual associations: "symbols"]

p 136
The most important conception underlying this reflection is that of the
difference between types and tokens, where "types" consist of specifications of
kinds of things, while "tokens" occur as their instances.

2 Abstract Systems and Physical Systems
3 Causal Systems and Semiotic Systems
4 The variety of Semiotic Systems
5 Symbol Systems and Causal Systems, p 145
[Newell and Simon's 'physical symbol systems' do *not* qualify as 'semiotic
systems'] the burden of my position falls upon the distinction between systems
for which something functions as a sign for a user of that system, and systems
for which something functions as a sign for that system itself.

6 Symbol Systems and Semiotic Systems
General purpose digital computers are causal systems that process expressions,
yet do not therefore need to be systems for which signs function as signs.

7 The Symbol-System and the Semiotic System Hypothesis
8 What About Humans and Machines? p 154
Strictly speaking, after all, to be a symbol system in Newell and Simon's sense
is neither necessary nor sufficient to be a semiotic system in the Peicean
sense. [T]heir account of designation presupposes the existence of what is
designated [...]

9 What Difference Does it Make?